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Introduction: Genesis vs. Gaia 
 
This chapter considers the competing ways in which human beings socially construct 
their claims upon natural resources. The axis around which conventional thinking tends 
to revolve is a distinction between anthropocentrism on the one hand and eco-centrism on 
the other. The former entails a set of assumptions about the primacy of humanity over 
Nature: assumptions that are challenged by the latter. The foundations of 
anthropocentrism run deep. The Biblical account of the Earth's creation conceptualises 
the Earth as an environment created for humanity: a world created for a free-willed 
species supposedly made in the creator's image. The Genesis narrative has not only 
informed the major religions of the world, but its allegorical potential has resonated with 
Western Enlightenment thinking, insinuating itself into the conceptual ethos and cultural 
norms of believers and non-believers alike. The challenge to this orthodoxy has equally 
ancient roots in Greek mythology, which on the one hand warns humanity against the 
hubris of Prometheus, who stole fire from the Gods to give to mere mortals, while on the 
other celebrating Gaia, the primordial Earth Mother, whose name has been appropriated 
by a contemporary hypothesis that the Earth as a self-sustaining organism will defend 
itself against the reckless encroachments of mortal humanity. 
 The Genesis narrative gives humanity licence to take from Nature. The Gaia 
hypothesis commands that humanity must live in harmony with Nature - or not at all. 
This is, if not a false dichotomy (Cockburn, 2010), a tired and oversimplified 
characterisation of a complex morass of ideas that this chapter will try in part to unravel. 
It will begin by recounting an earlier discussion concerning competing ecological 
discourses, before turning to a related discussion of competing approaches to human 
needs and social rights. It will attempt a synthesis between these two discussions and 
suggest the basis upon which social rights claims in relation to natural resources might in 
future be negotiated. It will conclude by re-examining the relevance to that negotiation of 
Marx's concept of stoffveschel, suggesting that it offers the possibility of a decisive break 






In a previous article I attempted to model the different ways in which 'green citizenship' 
might be conceptualised (Dean, 2001) and suggested that prevailing discourse draws 
upon analytically distinctive ecological moral repertoires that may be defined not so 
much in relation to the Genesis vs. Gaia dichotomy, as a twofold distinction reflecting 
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two intersecting dimensions along which Nature and humanity may be conceptualised. 
The first, inspired in part by Habermas' classification of social movements (Habermas, 
1987), distinguishes between emancipatory and defensive approaches: between, on the 
one hand, concerns for the freedom of the individual or for collective self-determination 
and, on the other, concerns for the preservation of the natural or the customary order. The 
second is a distinction (clumsily termed) between 'anti-social-humanistic' and 'pro-social-
humanistic' approaches: between, on the one had, a vision of the individual as an 
autonomous subject in a personal struggle for survival and, on the other, a vision of 
humanity as a social species engaged in a shared struggle for survival.  
 
[insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
The model or taxonomy that this analysis produced is illustrated in Figure 1. It defines 
four ecological moral discourses, each of which characterises a strand of thinking within 
the broad church (or 'Green tent') that is or has been the environmentalist/ecological 
movement, albeit that different individuals or groups within the tent may in practice draw 
on a combination of these discursive repertoires: 
 
Eco-modernisation is arguably the dominant discourse of the current era, reflecting an 
orthodoxy that emerged following the Brundtland report (Brundtland, 1987), but 
which finds variously inflected forms of expression in the writing of prominent 
academics (Dryzek, 1997), activists (Porritt, 1984) and, occasionally, policy makers. 
Though often espoused by social democrats, it is essentially liberal-individualistic. It 
seeks to emancipate the individual subject by freeing capitalism from the constraints 
of Nature. Its aim is to ameliorate the ecological consequences of industrial 
capitalism and apply technological fixes for the environmental obstacles to continued 
economic growth. Ecological sustainability is a means to an end. 
Deep greenism is the most radically eco-centric discourse and is reflected both in abstract 
idealism (Fox, 1984) and direct action. It is essentially misanthropic, since it 
subordinates the interests of the human species to the interests of other species and 
the interests of the Earth itself. It seeks to defend the planet from incursions by 
humanity. Its aim is to constrain economic production and human population growth. 
Ecological sustainability is an end in itself. 
Eco-communitarianism represents an older tradition that espouses humanity's oneness 
with Nature and the idea of the Earth citizen (Van Steenbergen, 1994); a tradition 
with both spiritual and republican dimensions. It is essentially conservative, inasmuch 
as it defends an ideal of natural harmony. It seeks to maintain or restore a social order 
in which human beings peacefully co-exist with the natural world.  Ecological 
sustainability is a moral good. 
Eco-socialism is by and large a discourse of the intellectual Left. Its roots are deep 
(Bukharin, 1925) and its contemporary relevance to social policy has been recognised 
(Bookchin, 1991), but its practical purchase has been limited. Its premise is that 
human exploitation of the Earth stemmed from humans' exploitation of other humans 
and that human emancipation from capitalist exploitation is a condition precedent for 
the survival of the Earth. Ecological sustainability is an ethical necessity. 
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This brief re-capitulation already incorporates some additional reflections and a 
realisation that this taxonomy does not necessarily tell us much about how social rights to 
natural resources may be constructed. 
 
  
Reflections on rights and needs 
 
Social rights, following Marshall (1950), are widely construed as rights enjoyed by 
citizens of the modern welfare state; as rights to individual livelihood, public services and 
social protection. It is assumed that as rights of citizenship social rights became possible 
only after a framework of civil and political rights had been established. Even when 
recognised as a component of our human rights under the UN's Universal Declaration of 
Rights, social rights have been referred to as 'second generation' rights (Eide, 2001); 
rights that could only be contemplated when 'first generation' civil and political freedoms 
had been won. It has lately been argued that social rights should be thought of as having 
preceded civil and political rights (Isin et al, 2008): that it is as social beings that we 
recognise the claims that others make upon us and that we might make upon them (Dean, 
2013). The claims that human beings make upon the Earth's resources were initially 
framed as customary rights; rights founded on social negotiation and mutual respect in 
order that human beings might survive. Such rights were and are axiomatically social. 
Surely, concepts of citizenship - including social citizenship - came along only after 
humans had begun to satisfy their needs as interdependent beings by framing their claims 
on natural resources as social rights. 
 And here we might pause to reflect on human need and that which humanity 
requires from Nature. I referred above to the intersecting dimensions along which 
humanity and Nature may be conceptualised. Those dimensions, I suggest, articulate with 
two kinds of distinction that may be drawn when seeking to understand human need 
(Dean, 2010).  
 The first is a distinction between inherent and interpreted need. To understand 
need as something that is inherent to the human individual requires a theory of 
personhood. Need stems from a person's objective interests or their personal preferences 
(Thomson, 1987); their inner drives (Maslow, 1943) or the very nature of their species-
being (Marx, 1844). Any theory of personhood is premised upon a doctrinal or ethical 
assumption about what it means to be human and therefore implies some notion of 
emancipation; some idea that to be a person requires a measure of relative autonomy or 
freedom. Alternatively, interpreted need entails an understanding of need that is 
pragmatic. Needs may be shaped by the norms and expectations of society (Baudrillard, 
1970; Smith, 1776), or they may be inferred or deduced from expert opinion, through the 
demands that people make or by means of  comparative study (Bradshaw, 1972). This 
pragmatic understanding is concerned with the moral grounds on which needs claims 
may be advanced and the practical basis on which they may be defended. Very clearly, 
inherent and interpreted understandings of need are mutually constitutive; they each 
inform the other. But the distinction is important to our understanding of how needs are 
constituted and how claims upon resources are legitimated. 
 The second distinction relating to the understanding of human need may be 
expressed as a distinction between thin needs and thick needs. This is a shorthand 
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allusion to Aristotle's (c. 350BC) distinction between 'hedonic' and 'eudaimonic' 
wellbeing. Thin need refers to the things required in order for a person to obtain pleasure 
and avoid pain. It is premised on a utilitarian calculus of individual satisfaction. Thick 
need refers to the things required in order for a person to flourish and to achieve a good 
life. It is premised on a commitment to human fulfilment and social engagement. Clearly, 
thin needs and thick needs are both important to human wellbeing. But different 
understandings of need may entail different emphases. 
 
[Insert figure 2 about here] 
 
The taxonomy that may be constructed using these two dimensions is illustrated in Figure 
2. It defines four needs-based approaches, each of which characterises a different 
foundation for social rights claims as socially mediated claims upon natural resources.  
 
The particular needs approach is essentially economistic and commensurate with free 
market liberalism. Human needs are particular in the sense that they reflect a call for 
autonomous participation in a perfectly competitive, yet harmoniously functioning, 
market economy. Our claims on Nature are mediated by the market. The right to have 
material needs met is doctrinally conceived in that the efficacy of markets as a 
mechanism through which to exploit natural resources is believed to depend upon the 
application of principles of formal equality of opportunity. In practice, therefore, 
substantive social rights are selective. They arise where a person - by reason of age, 
impairment or misfortune - lacks the means or the opportunity by which directly to 
participate in the process by which markets supposedly 'produce' material resources 
from Nature; she must have such education or training, healthcare or temporary 
financial assistance as will enable her to join or re-join the productive process. Rights 
are premised on the principle that the social subject should be specifically enabled to 
have an ostensibly self-sufficient (but in fact market dependent) relationship with 
Nature. 
The circumstantial needs approach is essentially moral authoritarian and commensurate 
with the Hobbesian/Benthamite approach that once informed social provision under 
the Poor Laws (yet remains in evidence today). Human needs are circumstantial in the 
sense that they reflect the imperative of survival in a hazardous natural environment. 
Our claims on Nature are not socially mediated; they stem from brute contingencies 
of individual existence within a competitive and unforgiving social environment. 
Insofar as one can claim against another a right to have one's 'natural' needs met, that 
right is necessarily conditional. People may bargain honourably with one another for 
the means of access to natural resources and this may give rise to everyday claims or 
expectations to which the term 'rights' may attach. However, if a person is unable to 
satisfy her needs by such means, she may seek social assistance only on condition 
that she is morally deserving. Rights are conditional on obedience to the moral 
authority of those who govern access to natural resources. 
The common needs approach is essentially paternalistic and commensurate with social 
conservativism. Human needs are needs held in common, reflecting an imperative of 
conformity and stability in a protective, but hierarchically ordered, society. Our 
claims on Nature are mediated by the social order. The right to have material needs 
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met is claimed on the basis that one belongs to and accepts one's place within a 
settled society. Such rights arise because the common denominator shared by all 
members of society is a degree of present or potential vulnerability within the natural 
world. Social rights are a matter of mutual moral obligation and the sharing of natural 
resources. 
The universal needs approach is essentially humanitarian and commensurate with social 
democracy or democratic socialism. Human needs are universal in the sense that they 
reflect a call for human fulfilment and the realisation of social humanity. Our claims 
on Nature are socially mediated by reason of our species-being. The right to have 
human needs met is an ethical imperative. Social rights are axiomatically inclusive, 
comprehensive in nature and unconditional. Such rights are premised on an ideal of 
collective responsibility for the optimal use of natural resources. 
 
This model defines competing approaches to human need and social rights that are 
seldom if ever espoused or implemented in ideal form, yet it characterises the range of 
approaches upon which social policy makers may draw in complex and often unreflexive 
and contradictory ways. The approaches co-exist with and feed off each other. They are 
dialectically implicated in the policy making process. To a certain extent these needs-
based approaches loosely map onto the ecological discourses outlined above and each 
might attempt to accommodate its anthropocentric tendencies with its eco-centric 






Discussions of environmental rights (Boyle, 2007; Friends of the Earth International, 
2003; Gearty, 2010) allude to issues of human access - individual and/or collective - to 
land, shelter, food, water and air as factors necessary for human  security, livelihoods and 
health. By and large environmental rights are regarded as a broad category of human 
rights, rhetorically defined or defined with reference to existing strands or 'generations' of 
rights within the international human rights framework. But this chapter is concerned 
with the environmental rights as social rights; rights grounded in sociality and which are 
subject to specific and ongoing processes of negotiation; rights grounded in a post-
Marshallian conception of social citizenship as a quotidian human practice or process 
(Dean, 2013). To that end, we may take the two taxonomies outlined above and consider 
how differing constructions of human need engage with or inform a variety of ecological 
discourses.  
 This enables us theoretically to identify competing social-ecological praxes: 
different ways in which conceptual or ideological assumptions are, or could be, translated 
into practice with different implications for the future of social policy.The dimensions 
around which our two preceding taxonomies were constructed may be synthesised into 
two further distinctions. The first distinction is concerned with the different ways in 
which policy issues may be framed: a distinction that maps on to that between 
emancipatory and defensive ecological approaches illustrated in Figure 1 and that 
between inherent and interpreted approaches to human need illustrated in Figure 2. It is a 
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distinction between the systemic and the pragmatic framing of policy issues; between, 
on the one hand, a strongly theoretically informed praxis, predicated on systemically 
conceived ideas of progress and personhood, and on the other, a more reactive form of 
praxis, predicated on experiences of, and pragmatic responses to, everyday challenges. 
The systemic-pragmatic continuum captures the degree to which claims on natural 
resources are reflexively defined. The second distinction is concerned with the different 
ways in which praxis may be oriented: a distinction that maps on to that between pro- and 
anti-humanistic ecological approaches illustrated in Figure 1 and that between thick and 
thin approaches to human need illustrated in Figure 2. It is a distinction between 
solidaristicly and individualisticly oriented forms of praxis: between, on the one hand, a 
strongly collectivist or co-operative social group orientation and, on the other, a more 
autonomistic or competitive individualistic focus.  The solidaristic-individualistic 
continuum captures the degree to which claims on natural resources are seen as shared 
claims. The resulting taxonomy is illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
[insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
Managing the Planet. The particular needs approach and the eco-modernisation agenda. 
Insofar as there is an emerging, albeit partial, global consensus it is underpinned by 
an economistic or essentially neo-liberal systemic framing. It is assumed that it is 
through the management of economic globalization that we may achieve the 
sustainable exploitation of natural resources. The emphasis is on low-carbon 
production techniques, renewable energy sources, waste re-cycling, carbon trading 
schemes and tax-incentives aimed at changing both corporate behaviour and 
individual life-styles. Social rights can over the longer term be developed or 
maintained through the avoidance of scarcity; they are adjuncts of economic 
competitiveness and continued economic growth. 
Staying Alive. The circumstantial needs approach and the deep ecology agenda. The 
'deep' green movement- or, at least, its most misanthropic and authoritarian elements - 
appears to have been less in evidence of late. There is perhaps a paradox to be 
addressed. What is characterised above as the circumstantial needs approach (which 
is at best sceptical towards ideas of 'rights' but is accepting of authority) can have 
populist right-wing appeal. However, the deep Green agenda demands a degree of 
selflessness and human sacrifice that is inimical to populist individualism. The 
messages of even light Green or moderate advocates of 'de-growth' (e.g. Jackson, 
2009) attract neither popular nor political support. Nevertheless, it might be foreseen 
that at the point where the effects of climate change self-evidently threaten life and 
limb, we may anticipate popular moral panic, including urgent and wholly selfish 
support for measures to mitigate the exploitation of natural resources and, in order to 
survive, a willingness belatedly to submit to the dictates of Nature: out of necessity, 
not principle. 
Sharing Earth's Bounty. The common needs approach and the green communitarian 
agenda. Light Green communitarianism and, for example, the Christian Democratic 
tradition emphasise the essentially conservative notion of 'stewardship'. Social rights 
are about the pragmatic preservation and sharing of available resources, albeit that the 
social order, like Nature itself, is not necessarily just or even handed - especially 
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when there is not enough to go round. The existing order should where necessary be 
defended against the 'manufactured risks' (Beck, 1992) associated with technological 
innovation. The environment should be conserved for the benefit of future 
generations. Social rights may be sustained, even during an era of austerity, by 
sensible collaboration between social partners. Or else social rights may be restored 
by going back to Nature and finding alternative ways of harnessing social resources. 
Working with Nature. The humanitarian approach and the eco-socialist agenda. I shall 
return in a moment to Marx's concept of 'social-ecological metabolism' (stoffvechsel - 
translated in some texts as the 'exchange of matter between Man and Nature'). The 
idea that human need is to be systemically framed with reference to the definitive 
characteristics of the human species is captured by Marx's metaphorical allusion to 
humanity's distinctive metabolism with Nature and his notion of the 'metabolic rift' 
occasioned by capitalism (Foster, 1999). It is an idea that has not explicitly informed 
left-wing thinking about the environment. Moderate eco-socialists do not necessarily 
demand that capitalism should be completely rolled back in order to restore the 
equilibrium between humanity and Nature. Nevertheless, they contend that ecological 
sustainability requires that social policy and planning should take precedence over 
economic policy and planning: economic production should be constrained so as to 
produce no more than is required to meet humanity's needs, while resources should be 
redistributed so as to ensure that everybody's social rights are adequately and 
meaningfully fulfilled. 
  
Like our preceding taxonomies, this model is a heuristic device. It does not precisely 
describe any of the factions or camps actually to be found within the 'Green tent'. Nor 
does it purport to predict future scenarios. It is an attempt critically to reflect upon the 
competing logics that are immanent within and expressed through hybrid forms of social-
ecological praxis. It is a way of thinking about the multitude of fragmented and often 
suboptimal processes and practices through which social policy at every level may 
engage with the cause of ecological sustainability: whether at an everyday community 
level, at the nation state level, or at the level of supranational or global policy 
frameworks. 
 Central to this multi-layered and multidimensional approach has been the concept 





Mention has already been made of Marx's application of the concept - stoffvechsel. The 
contemporary translation of the word - 'social-ecological metabolism' - is apt, but it is 
worth recalling the 1887 English translation of a key passage from Capital: 
 
The labour process … is human action with a view to the production of use-values, 
appropriation of natural substances to human requirements; it is the necessary condition for 
effecting exchange of matter between Man and Nature [stoffvechsel]; it is the everlasting 
Nature-imposed condition of human existence, and therefore is independent of every social 
phase of that existence, or rather, is common to every such phase. (Marx, 1887: 183-4) (see 
also Colletti, 1975: 28  regarding translation). 
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This is the historical materialist alternative to both the Genesis narrative and the Gaia 
hypothesis. It may be argued that historical materialism offers a theoretical basis for 
understanding the equilibrium between society and Nature (Bukharin, 1925: ch. V) and 
the regulation of that relationship 'from the side of Nature by natural laws governing the 
physical processes involved, and from the side of society by institutionalised norms 
governing the division of labour and distribution of wealth' (Hayward, 1994: 116). 
Benton (1988) would suggest that, taken as a whole, Marx's writings present two 
interdependent accounts: one concerning the need to 'humanise Nature' (to shape or 
civilise the natural world in the interests of humanity); the other concerning the need to 
'naturalise humanity' (to restore human beings' unity with Nature). Stoffvechsel - the 
process of social-ecological metabolism - defines the relationship between humanity and 
Nature as neither dominant nor parasitic, but symbiotic. Humanity is a product of Nature, 
yet interacts with it. Human society reflects the human essence of Nature and the natural 
essence of humanity, albeit under industrial capitalism in an 'alienated form' (Marx, 1844: 
355). The human species as a product of Nature is defined through work (i.e. the labour 
process as a distinctive form of metabolism with Nature); through its capacity for 
progressive historical development; through the unique form and level of cognition or 
consciousness that makes both purposeful work and historical development possible; and, 
fundamentally, by its sociality, its constitutive mutual interdependency (Markus, 1978). 
Through the wage relation, capitalism estranges human beings from their metabolism 
with Nature and through the commodity form, it reduces their species-being to an 'alien 
essence' (Chitty, 2009). Capital, as the manifestation of abstract value, obscures the 
meaning of humanity's substantive needs and the symbiotic claims on natural resources 
that stem from such needs. It is within this constrained context that the existing 
Marshallian concept of social rights has been forged, a concept that reduces social rights 
to claims mediated by capital and by the capitalist welfare state. 
 This account of humanity's essence and the subversion of its relationship to 
Nature is at one and the same time both normative and theoretical. It can be situated 
within the taxonomy presented in Figure 3, but it also provides an analytical critique 
through which to consider all forms of social-ecological praxis. Long before the birth of 
the environmental movement and contemporary concerns with environmental pollution, 
ecological degradation, resource depletion and climate change, Marx accused capitalism 
and specifically capitalist forms of industry of undermining the equilibrium between 
humanity and Nature. For example, in the often neglected third volume of Capital, he 
pays particular attention to problems back in the mid-nineteenth century of soil 
degradation and environmental damage associated with the emergence of the fertilizer 
industry and the failure to recycle urban organic waste (Marx, 1894). But more generally 
throughout his work, he sought to emphasise that capitalist production simultaneously 
undermined 'the original sources of all wealth - the soil and the worker' (Marx, 1887: 
505). Foster would contend that this amounts to a 'larger conceptual framework, 
emphasising the metabolic rift between human production and its natural conditions' 
(1999: 320). 
 While insisting on the primacy of the material means of production in the shaping 
of human societies, Marx (1887: 43) none the less endorsed the classical economist, 
William Petty's, aphorism that though labour is the 'father' of material wealth, the earth is 
its 'mother'. Indeed it is the fetishised character of the wage relation and the commodity 
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form that conceals the origins and significance of the material wealth that is generated 
through the metabolism between social humanity and Nature. The metabolic rift can be 
repaired. But this would ultimately require a revolution wherein the pursuit of 'radical 
needs' (the realisation of human potential) would replace market value as the measure of 
human achievement (see Heller, 1974). It would entail a freedom that, according to Marx 
(1894: 820), can only consist in socialised humanity, as 'associated producers, rationally 
regulating their interchange with Nature, bringing it under their common control'. In 
practice, some contend, 'capitalism will be humans' final mode of production on earth' 
(Harriss-White, 2012: 109) and that, for example, mitigating the effects of Man-made 
climate change  is now impossible within the prevailing  framework of finance-driven 
capitalism (Koch, 2012). And yet there is now no effective or immediate call to 
revolution against capitalism. Making the case for ecological socialism, O'Connor 
complains that conventional socialist resistance has in practice 
 
consisted of struggles for higher wages, shorter hours of work, full employment, rent 
control, subsidies to small farmers, and so on, or what can be called 'distributive justice'. 
Socialists have had a qualitative theoretical critique of capitalism and too often a 
quantitative political practice. (1998: 324) 
 
O'Connor calls - additionally or instead - for struggles over the qualitative conditions of 
production.  He argues that elements of eco-socialism have been immanent within a 
variety of new social movements and this we can, of course, see in the call by feminists 
and others for recognition as well as redistribution (e.g. Fraser, 1997) and in the 
scepticism of post-development theorists towards narrowly framed 'politics of demand' 
(e.g. Escobar, 1995).  The distinction between quantitative and qualitative dimensions, 
however, can also be seen in the context of the distinction made above between thin 
needs and thick needs. The Marxist theory of need is quintessentially qualitative and 
'thick': by defining human need in relation to the constitutive characteristics of our very 
species-being it allows for the framing of social rights claims and an understanding of 
social policy that is fundamentally qualitative. Social policy can challenge the conditions 
of production for example through the partial de-commodification of labour (e.g. 
Standing, 2009) and the promotion of public services having social rather than market 
value (e.g. Jordan, 2008) in facilitating ecological sustainability.   
 The contention of this chapter is that social rights to natural resources could be 
sustainably mediated through social policies premised on a radical theory of need; by the 
realisation of our human species-being in terms not of abstracted value, but substantive 
fulfilment. Key to achieving this, perhaps, would be an anti-capitalist struggle that is not 
merely immanent within, but explicitly shared between, a variety of social movements 
(cf. Callinicos, 2003). The seeds of such activity might, for example, be seen in the 
World Social Forum and the Occupy and Los Indignados movements, though the 
sustainability of such movements, paradoxically, is probably as fragile as any eco-system. 
Nevertheless, let us speculate as to the likely components of a radical de-
commodification social policy strategy: 
 
De-commodification of labour. One of the defining features of capitalist welfare states is 
the degree to which they allow for the partial de-commodification of labour 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990). But the terms and conditions on which workers may be 
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supported outwith the labour market play a key part in the maintenance of labour 
discipline (Dean, 1991).  Pushed far enough, quantitative claims for reduced 
working hours, higher wages, longer holidays, better pensions, greater job security 
can begin to impact qualitatively on the nature of wage labour. But global demands 
for 'decent work' (ILO, 1999) are nonetheless calibrated in quantitative not 
qualitative terms. And yet all work, according to Hegel (1805-6), must have 
qualitative 'moral value' - something  that need not apply when the worker is a 
disposable commodity (Sennett, 1998). A radical de-commodification strategy 
would seek to break the link between work and subsistence: human beings need 
both, but one should not be conditional on the other. A case that can be made for 
the proliferation of basic income schemes - depending on the context and their 
adequacy - is that by breaking the link between work and subsistence, they could 
reign back destructive forms of economic production and  promote socially useful 
activity (e.g. Torry, 2013). 
De-commodification of land. Another distinctive feature of established welfare states has 
been the development of various forms of housing policy: including housing costs 
support, regulation of rents and housing conditions, and the subsidising and/or 
provision of social housing (e.g. Lund, 2011). But the provision of shelter for 
human habitation is wholly dependent on the ownership and control of land and 
housing policy is not the same as land policy (Davy, 2012 ), which has global 
implications not just for human shelter, but also for access to natural resources. 
Quantitative concerns with rents and housing costs do not address the fundamental 
qualitative issues that stem from the status of land as alienable property; as a 
commodity, rather than as space where people might lead their lives. But even the 
social provision of housing entails by and large only a partial de-commodification. 
A radical de-commodification strategy would seek to extend common ownership or 
control of land raising critical (though hardly new) questions as to just how 
collaborative use of common pool resources can be negotiated and managed 
(Ostrom, 1990). 
The de-commodification of human services. Capitalist welfare states also make provision 
for human services which may to varying degrees be de-commodified, and globally 
there is concern to promote human service development. Foremost among these is 
educational provision. The United Nations' Millennium Development Goals include 
a global commitment to universal primary education (United Nations Development 
Programme, 2003), though secondary and tertiary education throughout much of 
the world is by and large only partially de-commodified. Neo-Marxist and some 
non-Marxist critics (e.g. Freire, 1972) complains that state-capitalist education 
systems directly serve capitalist interests through their reproduction of, and 
hegemonic influence upon, labour. A radical de-commodification strategy might 
seek to break the link between capitalist interests and educational practices by 
emphasising the role of education in developing the human personality (rather than 
developing human capital) or through what Freire called a conscientising 'pedagogy 
of the oppressed'.  Healthcare is a more widely commodified human service, though 
in most countries the state is involved in regulating, funding and/delivering health 
provision. Once again, critics of socialised medicine under capitalism have long 
complained, on the one hand, that it serves capitalist interests (Doyal, 1979) and, on 
 11 
the other, that its commodified form and the vested interests of medical 
professionals can have iatrogenic effects (i.e. medical interventions can cause not 
cure disease) (Illich, 1977). A radical de-commodification strategy might seek to 
foster public health and healthcare delivery models and technologies that do not 
objectify people as patients or consumers but allow them to optimise their lives in 
harmony with the environment. 
 
A reconceptualisation of social rights could play a key part in healing the metabolic rift 





The focus of this chapter has been on the various ways in which the claims that humanity 
may make on Nature can be framed as social rights. It has shown how the relationship 
between social rights and natural resources is subject to a variety of competing 
discourses, moral traditions, and political approaches. It has argued for a post-
Marshallian understanding of social rights and social citizenship, contending that as a 
social species, humanity's negotiation of individual and collective claims upon natural 
resources - whether locally or globally - has always proceeded and will continue to 
proceed in a multiplicity of ways. The implication is that social policy will respond to 
environmental issues - whether reactively or proactively - in a variety of ways, at 
different sites and in different contexts around the world. The taxonomy of socio-
ecological praxes that has been presented offers a heuristic framework for the analysis of 
those multiple responses. The attempt to present a post-Marxist conception of social-
ecological metabolism provides a particular means to critique such responses and a 
window through which to address key issues around ecological sustainability. 
 If, as surely we must, it is accepted that humanity faces a self-inflicted and 
imminent threat from environmental degradation, resource depletion and climate change, 
it will fall to social policy to address the consequences in terms of resource distribution, 
the maintenance of livelihoods and social sustainability. A praxis aimed at Managing the 
Planet will tend to subordinate social rights claims to the perceived constraints of market 
forces as these adapt reactively to ecological crisis: social policy will be on the back foot. 
This appears to be the dominant praxis, as expressed through an emerging consensus in 
favour of 'green growth' (OECD, 2011; United Nations Environment Programme, 2011; 
World Bank, 2010). A praxis focused on Staying Alive would not emerge until the 
ecological crisis is far advanced and social rights are self-evidently in jeopardy: social 
policy will be left waiting in the wings. Though it is a latent praxis, the possibility of 
harnessing an insurgent resistance against capitalism's self-destructive power must be 
borne in mind. A praxis aimed at Sharing Earth's Bounty will be forced to accommodate 
social rights claims to the ecological crisis, but the process will be brokered within 
existing and increasingly strained social relations of power: social policy will be subject 
to compromise. As a praxis, this embodies socially minded responses within the 
parameters of existing relations of power and is expressed, for example, in a demand 
made in a UNRISD report that a green growth economic strategy might incorporate 
social goals (Cook, Smith, & Utting, 2012) or, just possibly, by certain nascent elements 
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within the Corporate Social Responsibility agenda (Vogel, 2006). A praxis focused on 
Working with Nature would make social rights claims central to restoring equilibrium 
between humanity and nature: social policy would take centre stage. But it must be 
accepted that such a praxis might have to work with or within the context of other 
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